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ABSTRACT
Three decades ago, Dr. J. Henry Glazer, onetime Chief Counsel for NASA
Ames, proposed the establishment of a body of astrolaw. “The direct subjects
of Space Law are sovereign nations”1 he observed. The four widely ratified
space treaties contain principles and guidelines designed to govern the
activities of State. Conversely, the direct subjects of astrolaw would be natural
and legal persons in space. In Dr. Glazer’s view, “astrolaw focuses not upon
space as a legal regime, but upon space as a place.”2 Our evolution into
a spacefaring species, with single and then multiple human communities
off-Earth, is a human necessity. Assuring the sustainability and success of

1.
2.
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those communities requires the development of guidelines and principles
that recognize space as a place, and not a legal regime.
We are experiencing a paradigm shift in how activities are conducted
in space. Space actors are no longer just governments. And soon, humans
in space will not all be government employees or contractors. Elon Musk
has promised to send a spacecraft of civilians around the Moon, and more
than one company is exploring the establishment of a private space station
for use as a hotel. Not only will we have civilian tourists in space, we will
have civilian workers to cater to their needs. Addressing on-orbit torts
and crimes through the current space treaty regime would lead to
jurisdictional absurdities and even diplomatic morass.
This Article proposes that the advent and proliferation of space tourism
should be the main frame from which we, as a society and global community,
consider the regulation of extraterrestrial human civilization. The presentation
advocates for the establishment of a Code of Conduct containing principles
and guidelines designed to govern the activities and behavior of humans in
space. The Code will be loosely modeled on the Code of Conduct for the
Space Station Crew developed pursuant to the International Space Station
Intergovernmental Agreement. However, rather than the individual remaining
the responsibility of his or her national or sponsoring government, the
individual shall be responsible for his or her own actions. This Article outlines
the substantive terms of the Code of Conduct which, the author proposes
should be adopted by national governments and implemented through national
regulatory regimes.
Establishing a Code of Conduct will lay the foundation for a universal
law, astrolaw, in anticipation of the commonality of humans living, working
and vacationing in space. It will support and sustain the success of
extraterrestrial human communities. It will help prevent unnecessary
conflict that may, because of State responsibility for nationals in space,
easily rise to diplomatic crisis. And it will thwart the threat of dystopian
tyranny on these private pockets of human civilization. Finally, it will
assure the safety of the hardy souls that venture into space as private citizens
and work responsibly to develop international guidelines that will prevent
disasters, without stifling commercial industry, innovation and exploration.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to contemplate a more fitting paradigm of a heterotopia
than a human communal existence on a spacecraft. In medicine, heterotopia
is defined as “misplacement or displacement,” the occurrence of something
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where it is abnormal.3 In the hostile environment of space, the fundamental
right of an individual to breathe cannot exist naturally as it does here on
Earth. As such, a human presence in space is certainly aberrant. Thus, it
is perhaps not surprising that, the laws that exist to regulate, or at least
guide, human activity in outer space are directed not at individuals but at
sovereign nations. This State-centric legal regime has performed admirably
for more than fifty years. The approximately 570 humans that have ventured
into Earth’s orbit and beyond have been sent there as agents of their sovereign
nations or under the authority of a sponsoring government.4 In particular,
individuals who reside on the International Space Station (ISS), even for
a short period of time, are the responsibility of their government, or of a
sponsor government,5 and are required to abide by a code of conduct negotiated
and executed by the sovereign partners in the facility.6
These government-sponsored spacefarers can expect company very soon.
This author agrees with Al Globus that human migration off of our home
planet will begin with private space stations.7 Globus “sees the process
beginning with private space stations, similar in scale to today’s International
Space Station, some of which could be space hotels. Those would be
followed by ever-larger settlements in low orbit around the Earth, then located
farther out.”8 A number of companies are developing extended space tourism
3. Heterotopia, Heterotopia, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/
heterotopia [https://perma.cc/223Q-PJZB] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).
4. Astronaut/Cosmonaut Statistics, WORLDSPACEFLIGHT.COM, https://www.worldspace
flight.com/bios/stats.php [https://perma.cc/RD9S-U5R2] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).
5. See Carla Sharpe and Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of Public Manned
Spaceflight and Space Station Operations, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 648−49 (Franks
von der Dunk et al. eds., 2015).
6. See generally Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International
Space Station, Can.-ESA-Japan-Russ-U.S., art. 11, Jan. 29, 1998, 1998 U.S.T. LEXIS
212 [hereinafter ISS Agreement]; see also ESA Press Release No. 23-2001, W. Michael
Hawed, ISS MCB Chairman, Decision Paper on Russian Aviation and Space Agency
(Rosaviakosmos) Request for MCB Approval of Exemption to Fly Mr. Dennis Tito
Aboard the April 2001 Soyuz 2 Taxi Flight to the International Space Station (ISS) (Apr.
24, 2001), http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Human_and_Robotic_Exploration/International
_Space_Station/International_Space_Station_partners_grant_flight_exemption_for_Dennis
_Tito [https://perma.cc/35RF-AGM8].
7. Corey S. Powell, Jeff Bezos Foresees a Trillion People Living in Millions of
Space Colonies. Here’s What He’s Doing to Get the Ball Rolling, NBC NEWS (May 15,
2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/jeff-bezos-foresees-trillion-people-livingmillions-space-colonies-here-ncna1006036 [https://perma.cc/62NL-GTUH].
8. Id. Another interesting comparison can be made to Antarctica. “In the 1990s,
there were about 5,000 tourists visiting Antarctica each year.” Maham Abedi, Antarctica
Keeps Attracting Visitors – And it may be ‘Last-Chance Tourism,’ GLOBAL NEWS (Mar.
10, 2018), https://globalnews.ca/news/4072700/antarctica-tourism-climate-change/
[https://perma.cc/8FB9-ABNT] (“Between April 2016 and 2017, 44,376 travellers [sic]
came to the continent.”). Wealthy tourists will likely be responsible for this kind of growth in
space tourism as well. The difference, of course, is that while Antarctica is an exotic
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projects, to the existing ISS, to private, commercial space stations and
even in spacecraft destined for lunar orbit.9 Axiom Space aims to host
continuous ten-day “missions” to ISS as early as 2021.10 Indeed:
NanoRacks has laid out a roadmap for creating orbital outposts from recycled
rocket upper stages. Orion Span has its own plan to send a hotel habitat into orbit
by as early as 2022. And Bigelow Aerospace, which already has two uncrewed
modules in orbit, has created a separate company to operate expandable space
stations.11

Applying the body of international law considered to be “space law” to
decidedly human, non-governmental activities produces a muddle of
uncertainty. What rules should apply? What courts are competent to hear
claims? And, most importantly, what rights do humans have when in space?
These uncertainties are compounded by a space treaty regime that imposes
liability at the State level for damages caused by private actors. Diplomacy
may be effective, but it does not create the legal precedents necessary to
provide a certainty upon which to base future decisions. The heterotopias
in space need the architecture of law to, among other things: ensure the
safety and freedom of the hardy souls that venture into space as private
citizens; prevent unnecessary conflict, which may, because of State
responsibility for nationals in space, easily rise to diplomatic crisis; and
provide legal certainties around which commercial space actors can plan.
The need for a uniform construct of law is made even more acute given
that what happens in space will almost undoubtedly affect humankind as

destination that offers adventure and excitement, the lure of space is, in part, in its infinite
horizon. An individual can cross the continent of Antarctica but the mystery of space may,
literally, never end.
9. See Powell, supra note 7; SpaceX is also planning a tourist flight destined for lunar
orbit. In 2018, the company announced that it would fly “a coterie of artists” around the
Moon “as early as 2023. . .” Mike Wall, SpaceX Will Fly a Japanese Billionaire (and
Artists, Too!) Around the Moon in 2023, SPACE.COM (Sept. 18, 2018) https://www.space.com/
41854-spacex-unveils-1st-private-moon-flight-passenger.html [https://perma.cc/W6R7L5T5].
10. Dianna Wray, Who Will Build the First Commercial Space Station?, HOUSTONIA
(Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.houstoniamag.com/articles/2019/10/28/who-will-build-thefirst-commercial-space-station [https://perma.cc/GS5F-L436].
11. Alan Boyle, Axiom Space Offers Space Station Vacations Starting in 2020, for
$55 Million, GEEKWIRE (June 13, 2018), https://www.geekwire.com/2018/axiom-spaceoffers-space-station-vacations-starting-2020-cool-55-million/ [https://perma.cc/Z2PT-98R2].
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a whole as space accidents can “change the Earth’s environment, pollute
the atmosphere and produce incalculable effects on life.”12
This Article proposes that the advent and proliferation of private space
stations should be the mainframe from which we, as a society and global
community, consider the adoption of fundamental principles of “astrolaw”13
that will nurture and protect extraterrestrial human civilization. In support
of this proposal, the Article will first review the current outer space law
regime and the application of that regime to private space activities, with
a focus on the private operation of a space station for purposes of tourism.
It will continue with the submission of three realistic scenarios which will
highlight the gaps and uncertainties currently inherent to the regulation of
private human residency in space. Finally, the Article proposes the fundamental
principles that should be captured as an international baseline for astrolaw.
After all:
[t]he achievement of our human imperative—and of the global and interplanetary
constitutions necessary for its realization—will be one of the most monumentally
delicate, difficult long-term projects ever undertaken by a human civilization. A
poor beginning will seriously threaten its achievement.14

II. CURRENT “SPACE LAW”
A. “Space Law”
It is technically incorrect to assert that there is a “legal vacuum” in and
beyond orbit. What exists in reality is a framework governing sovereign
space activities. A framework with a glaring and yawning gap—a vast
legal uncertainty in respect of what laws will apply to private actors, in
particular, to private entities that operate stations in space. The norms that
govern State activities in space are grounded in international law.
However, the launch of Sputnik 1, Earth’s first artificial satellite in 1957,
goaded discussions about the need to more specifically regulate the
exploration and use of outer space.15 Tremendous credit must be given to
the diplomats from around the globe tasked with both understanding the

12. MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
LAW-MAKING 113 (Tanja L. Masson-Zwaan et al. eds., Brill Nijhoff 2010) (1972).
13. “Astrolaw contemplated the practice of law in outer space . . . The direct subjects of
Space Law are sovereign nations; the direct subjects of Astrolaw are natural and legal
persons in space . . . Astrolaw focuses not upon space as a legal regime, but upon space as
a place.” GEORGE S. ROBINSON & HAROLD M. WHITE, JR., ENVOYS OF MANKIND: A
DECLARATION OF FIRST PRINCIPLES FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF SPACE SOCIETIES 147 (quoting J.
Henry Glazer) (Smithsonian Inst. Pr. 1986).
14. Id. at 150.
15. Steve Garber, Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, NASA History (Oct.
10, 2007), https://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/ [https://perma.cc/BDZ8-WQLF].
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implications of humankind’s ability to reach space and working in the
shadow of a Cold War to ensure international cooperation and, more
importantly, peace in outer space.16 As the Soviet Ambassador to the
United Nations (UN) stated in 1966,
Man’s penetration of outer space and the activity of States in exploring its
peaceful uses confronted the United Nations with serious problems. The question
arose whether outer space, the moon and other planets were to become an area of
peace and international co-operation or were to be used by the forces of
aggression for purposes inimical to the interests of peace-loving people.17

In December 1958, the UN, “recognizing the common interest of mankind
in outer space and recognizing that it [wa]s the common aim that outer
space should be used for peaceful purposes only,” established an ad hoc
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).18 COPUOS
was made a permanent body of the UN in 1959.19
Under the auspices of COPUOS a quintet of international conventions
were negotiated and ratified, including the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST),20 the Agreement on the Rescue
of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (Rescue Agreement),21 the Convention on the International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention),22
the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(Registration Convention),23 and the Agreement Governing the Activities

16. See id.
17. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Summary Record
of the Fifty-Seventh Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.57 at 8 (July 12, 1966).
18. G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), Question of Peaceful Use of Outer Space, at 5−6 (Dec.
13, 1958).
19. G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, at 5−6 (Dec. 12, 1959).
20. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
21. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 672 U.N.T.S. 119
[hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
22. Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
23. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened
for signature Jan. 13, 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
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of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement).24
The Moon Agreement is not widely ratified.25 Thus, an understanding of
the obligations and responsibilities of “space law,” such as it is, requires
review of the four remaining treaties.
B. State Parties Are Responsible for Private Activity
1. Responsibility: A Compromise
Had the Soviet Union fully prevailed in the space negotiations, the
question of a private space station would be moot: in its first proffered draft
of basic principles, the Soviet Union, the nation responsible for putting
the first man in space, sought to limit the exploration and use of outer space
“solely and exclusively”26 to State. It was a stance that many analysts
attribute to the Soviet’s communist ideology that made the government
“squarely against any private activities in most economically relevant
areas of society.”27 Despite the fact that the Soviet Union and the United
States were the only space actors at the time, the United States, self-styled
“champion of free-enterprise,” was opposed to prohibiting private enterprise
in space, no matter how far-fetched an idea it must have seemed at the
time. 28 The first Declaration of Principles approved by the UN in
December 1963 (the 1963 Declaration) does not prohibit the activities of
private entities in space, nor does it purport to directly regulate such
entities.29 Instead, it proposes a regime of responsibility and supervision,
making State accountable for the activities of their civilian citizens in

24. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
25. Only 18 States have ratified the Agreement. See Comm. On the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space, Status of Int’l Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1
Jan. 2019, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2019/CRP.3 (2019), https://www.unoosa.org/documents/
pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/AC105_C2_2019_CRP03E.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2AN-46PX].
26. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Declaration of the Basic Principles
Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Space, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/L.02 (Sept. 10, 1962).
27. F.G. von der Dunk, The Origins of Authorization: Article VI of the Outer Space
Treaty and International Space Law, 69 SPACE, CYBER, AND TELECOMM. L. PROGRAM FAC.
PUB. 1, 1 (2011).
28. Id.; see generally, U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECHN. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BP-ISC41, SPACE STATIONS AND THE LAW: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES – BACKGROUND PAPER,
DOCUMENTS ON OUTER SPACE LAW, PAPER 12, 19−20 (1986) [hereinafter BACKGROUND
PAPER].
29. G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Dec. 13,1963) [hereinafter 1963
Declaration].
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outer space.30 The responsibility can be broken down into three duties as
follows:
(1) States bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space,
whether carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities;
(2) [states must assure that such national activities] are carried on in conformity
with the principles set forth in the . . . Declaration; (3) the activities of nongovernmental entities in outer space shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the State concerned.31

2. The Responsibility Compromise Enshrined by Treaty
Of course, a UN Resolution, while an admirable expression of intent is
neither binding nor enforceable.32 Again, to the credit of the 1960s diplomatic
force, and the pragmatic leadership of the Cold War antagonists—the
United States and the Soviet Union—who also happened to be the primary
space actors at the time, COPUOS undertook the task of developing
binding law.33 The Outer Space Treaty (OTS) is well-recognized as the
culmination of eight years of “earnest effort to articulate and define general
standards of behavior that should govern states in the use of outer space
and celestial bodies.”34
While the preliminary U.S. draft of the proposed treaty did not include
the State responsibility provision of the 1963 Declaration,35 the Soviet
Union’s draft offered language substantially comparable to the 1963 Declaration,
confirming national responsibility for “national activities in outer space . . .
whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by
non-governmental bodies corporate.”36 Mimicking the 1963 Declaration
language, the Soviet Union draft further stipulated that the “activities of

30. See id.
31. Id. ¶ 5.
32. Articles 10 and 14 of the UN Charter refer to General Assembly resolutions as
“recommendations.”
33. See supra notes 19−23 and accompanying text.
34. Treaty on Outer Space: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 19th Cong. 3 (1967) (statement of Dean Rusk, Sec’y of State).
35. Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated June
16, 1966 from the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America addressed to the Chairman
of the Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/32 (June 17, 1966).
36. Permanent Rep. of the USSR to the U.N., Letter dated June 16, 1966 from the
Permanent Rep. of the USSR to the U.N. addressed to Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A.AC.105/C.2/L.13 (July 11, 2966).

113

HANLON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/6/2020 2:42 PM

non-governmental bodies corporate in outer space shall require authorization
and continuing supervision by the State concerned.”37
The United States did not object to the Soviet Union’s proffered language
on this point; however, it did raise concern that “the words ‘nongovernmental bodies corporate’ should be replaced by the words ‘nongovernmental entities,’ since in U.S. jurisprudence the term ‘bodies corporate’
implied a limitation.”38 Following this submission, the Soviet Union clarified
that it intended the OST to cover any “group of persons or an organization
duly recognized as such in accordance with national legislation.”39 Ultimately,
the wording agreed upon by the working group for what is now Article VI
of the OST includes: (1) “international responsibility” for “national activities”
of “non-governmental entities,”40 a term both the United States and the Soviet
Union sought to be defined as broadly as possible; (2) the requirement that
States assure that all national activities, including those carried out by nongovernment entities, are “carried out in conformity with the provisions”
of the OST;41 and (3) the stipulation that all activities by non-governmental
entities require “authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate
State.”42 In short, the OST is clear that international law applies to State
activities in space and that States are responsible for at least some of the
actions of their national citizens.43 Therefore, private actions are regulated
by international law and the treaties to which a private person’s State
government has adhered.
C. Understanding the Obligations of Actors in Space
Obligations of actors in space and their liability for activities in space
arise under general international law such as Articles VI and VII of the
Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention,
and the Rescue Convention.44 Understanding how these international laws
relate to each other is key to understanding how human activity in space
can be policed and to understanding what laws will affect efforts to seek
compensation and avoid unjust enrichment in the wake of accidents.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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1. General International Law
It is well-recognized under international law that States have direct
responsibility for their own acts, including the “acts of [their] officials
acting in their official capacity.”45 While a State is not
directly responsible for injuries caused to foreign states or their nationals by the
acts of private persons, whether nationals or non-nationals, [it] owes at all times
a duty towards other States to use due diligence in accordance with the prevailing
international standard to prevent, suppress and repress any violations of their
rights, including those of their nationals, taking place in areas subject to its
effective jurisdiction, any by whomsoever committed. . .46

2. Article VI of the OST
Article VI of the OST goes beyond “due diligence” and makes States
directly responsible for private activities in space.47 As noted above, the
OST has three specific requirements.48 First, States parties to the OST
“shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer
space . . . whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies
or by non-governmental entities.”49 Second, parties must assure that activities
by private entities are “carried out in conformity with the provisions set
forth in the present [OST].”50 Third, parties must subject any such activities
to authorization and continuing supervision.51 The practical result is that
all non-governmental space activities are “assimilated to governmental
space activities.”52 In other words, “every thing [sic] that is done by . . .
non-governmental entities is deemed to be an act immutable to the State
as if it were its own act, for which it bears direct responsibility.”53 It is, as
Bin Cheng describes it, an “almost revolutionary” innovation introduced
into international law.54 Indeed, Article VI of the OST has a much broader
45. Bin Cheng, Article VI of the 1967 Space Treaty Revisited: “International
Responsibility”, “National Activities”, and “The Appropriate State”, 26 J. OF SPACE L. 7, 11
(1998).
46. Id. at 11−12.
47. See F.G. von der Dunk, supra note 27, at 4.
48. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art.VI.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Cheng, supra note 45, at 14−15.
53. Id. at 15.
54. Id.; see also FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 60
(2nd ed. 2018).
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reach than the liability provisions in either Article VII of the OST or in
the Liability Convention.55 That said, each State party is only “internationally
responsible,” suggesting that States parties do not “bear domestic responsibility
vis-à-vis its own nationals or their property.”56
3. Article VII of the OST, the Liability Convention and the
Registration Convention
Under Article VII of the OST and under the Liability Convention, State
parties are “absolutely liable” for damage to another State party “caused
by [their] space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight.”57
But, and this is important in respect of private space stations,
[i]n the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth
to a space object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such
a space object by a space object of another launching State, the latter shall be
liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is
responsible.58

Thus, while Article VII of the OST and the Liability Convention address
damage caused by space objects only, it can be said that Article VI of the
OST imposes liability on States for any other damages that may arise in
respect of public or private activities in space.59 Notably, the Liability
Convention reinforces the Article VI notion that States are responsible for
the activities of private entities as State liability arises in respect of anyone
or entity “for whom it is responsible.”60 The use of the word “responsible”
here clearly ties back to the concept of States bearing “international
responsibility” for the activities carried out by non-governmental entities.61
In elaborating on the notion of which State is the “responsible” or
“appropriate” State, Article VII of the OST, the Liability Convention and
the Registration Convention introduce the concept of “the launching
State” and place liabilities and obligations upon it.62 The launching State
can be: (1) the State “which launches” the object, (2) the State which procures
the launch of the object, (3) the State from whose territory the object is

55. Cheng, supra note 45, at 15.
56. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 28, at 26.
57. Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. II.
58. Id. art. III.
59. The English version of the OST uses the term “responsibility” in Article VI and
“liability” in Article VII. While the significance of this word choice may be debated, the
“Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish texts do not make such a distinction and use the
same term ‘responsible’ or its equivalent” in both articles. Cheng, supra note 45, at 10.
60. Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. III.
61. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at arts. VI−VII.
62. Id.; Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. VII.
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launched, or (4) the State from whose facility the object is launched.63
Furthermore, the Liability Convention is clear that there can be more than
one launching State and, that in such an instance, all launching States are
jointly and severally liable for damage caused by the space object.64
Additionally, a “[s]tate from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched shall be regarded as a participant in a joint launching.”65 While
these categories appear relatively straightforward, there is some question
as to what it means to “procure” a launch.66 For example, if an entity
manufactures items intended solely for space, can it be assumed that such
entity will inevitably “procure” a launch thereby making its national
government a launching States?
Like Article VI of the OST, the Liability Convention seems to exclude
domestic responsibility or liability.67 Article VII of the Liability Convention
indicates that it “shall not apply to damage caused by a space object of a
launching State to: (a) nationals of that launching State; [and] (b) foreign
nationals during such time as they are participating in the operation of that
space object from the time . . . .”68
D. Interpreting the Obligations
While it is undeniable that States parties are responsible and liable for
the activities of even their nongovernmental entities, the depth and breadth of
that responsibility remains open to interpretation.
1. “National Activities”
Under Article VI of the OST, for example, States parties are only
internationally responsible for “national activities.”69 But what constitute
national activities? Frans von der Dunk has summarized the three main
schools of thought.70 First, and most all-encompassing, is the “nationalist”

63. See Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. I(c); Registration Convention,
supra note 23, at art. I(a).
64. Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. 5(3).
65. Id.
66. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. VII.
67. Id.; see also Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. VI.
68. Id. art. VII.
69. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. VI.
70. F.G. von der Dunk, supra note 27, at 5.
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theory which takes the “adjective ‘national’ to refer to the noun ‘national’”71
and, as such, interprets “national activities” to mean “activities of nationals.”72
A second school of thought seeks to reconcile Article VI and Article VII
of the OST and interprets the concept of national activities to include anything
in respect of a space object for which that State may be considered a launching
State.73 In a similar vein, some argue that national activities should refer
to the State of registry as that State pursuant to the Registration Convention.74
However, this suggests that a State could avoid responsibility simply by
failing to register its space object. The third theory focuses on the
“authorization and continuing supervision” provision of Article VI of the
OST “against a background of international law.”75 Using this approach,
national activities refer to activities over which a State has the legal tools
to exert control, usually through territorial or personal jurisdiction.76
Expanding on this concept, Bin Cheng suggests that national activities
include any activity that may be considered within a State’s territorial,
quasi-territorial, or personal jurisdiction.77 The effect of this interpretation
will almost certainly mean that more than one State will have “responsibility”
over certain accidents or events. Such jurisdictional conflicts would be
handled under current terrestrial public and private international law.78
2. States Must Assure Conformity with OST Only?
Article VI of the OST clearly indicates that States parties must assure
“national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions” of
the OST and of international law.79 The provisions of the OST require that
exploration and use be carried out “for the benefit and interests of all
countries”80 and “in accordance with international law.”81 As Bin Cheng
71. Id. at 5−6.
72. Id. at 6; see also Cheng, supra note 45, at 22.
73. F.G. von der Dunk, supra note 27, at 6.
74. Cheng, supra note 45, at 20. The Registration Convention requires that “when
a space object is launched into earth orbit or beyond, the launching State shall register the
space object by means of an entry in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain.”
Registration Convention, supra note 23, at art. II(1).
75. F.G. von der Dunk, supra note 27, at 6.
76. Id. at 7.
77. Cheng, supra note 45, at 23−24. Territorial jurisdiction would cover events
within the relevant State’s territory. Quasi-territorial jurisdiction would cover spacecraft and
objects of a State’s registry, and personal jurisdiction would cover individual and corporate
nationals.
78. F.G. von der Dunk, supra note 27, at 6; cf. Cheng, supra note 45, at 25 (discussing
methods of solving jurisdictional conflicts).
79. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. VI.
80. Id. art. I.
81. Id. art. III.
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points out, “[m]ore difficult is the question whether the international
responsibility of the States Parties extends to . . . failures to comply with
rules of private law . . . or criminal law.”82 Article VI indicates that States
parties bear “international responsibility.”83 Does this mean responsibility
only for violations of international public law, or does it mean States are
“responsible directly to one another in respect of their non-governmental
activities,”84 whether violations are of international law or private law?
3. Authorization and Continuing Supervision
As with the other terms discussed, there is no definition in the OST of
what to authorize or continually supervise a non-governmental entity in
space means.85 Clearly, this burden is somewhat more than the due diligence
each State owes the other to prevent violation or suppression of rights.
Moreover, given the terms of the OST, failure to properly authorize and
supervise could induce direct State liability in addition to liability incurred
for the private entity activity itself.86 Many spacefaring nations have
promulgated licensing and regulatory regimes in order to meet their Article
VI authorization and supervision requirements.87 To date, no State has been
formally charged with failing to meet this burden.88
82. Cheng, supra note 45, at 17.
83. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. VI.
84. Cheng, supra note 45, at 17.
85. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. VI.
86. See Cheng, supra note 45, at 13−14.
87. For example, “[c]ountries like the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian
Federation, Sweden, France, South Africa, and South Korea have already adopted specific
laws and regulations that govern all or most space activities carried out from their territories
or by their citizens. China, Germany, Canada and Japan have passed a few specific laws and
also have made some necessary modifications to relevant existing general laws in order to
extend their application to space activities.” RAM JAKHU, ED., NATIONAL REGULATION OF
SPACE ACTIVITIES vii (2010). Further to this end, the United Nations Office for Outer
Space Affairs launched a “Space Law for New Space Actors” initiative that will “offer UN
Member States tailored capacity building to facilitate their drafting of national space
legislation. . .” Press Release, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs Signed an
Agreement with the Government of Luxembourg to Launch new “Space Law for New Space
Actors,” (Nov. 13, 2019), http://spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=54919 [https://perma.cc/
8CHR-9S44].
88. The author has found no instances in which Article VI has been asserted in any
legal claims and there are no international court opinions offering guidance in respect of
the interpretation of this Article; see generally Frans G. von der Dunk, The Origins of
Authorisation: Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and International Space Law, Space,
Cyber, and Telecommunications Law Program Faculty Publications, Digital Commons,
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4. The Appropriate State Party
A related question that also generates high levels of uncertainty is,
which country constitutes “the Appropriate State Party”89 that must authorize
and supervise? Interestingly, this particular wording was changed from
the wording in the 1963 Declaration which placed the supervisory burden
on “the State concerned.”90 Whether this is significant or not is difficult
to say. Equally equivocal is the use of the singular and definite article
“the” in both versions of the provision. Arguably, this suggests that only
one State is ever required to undertake authorization and supervision and,
as a result, only one State can bear international responsibility for a space
object. There has been much discussion about this singularity.91 However,
given the liability provisions contained in Articles VI and VII of the OST,
as well as the Liability and Registration Conventions, these discussions
are moot.
First, both the Registration Convention and the Liability Convention
place additional burdens on each State, which suggests that there will often
be more than one “Appropriate State Party.” Indeed, every launching State
can be considered “appropriate.” Secondly, given that “national activities”
for which a State party bears international responsibility may include any
activity by a national of that State or over which the State may have some
control through personal jurisdiction, it seems there are many opportunities
to be labelled as “appropriate.” Ultimately, it is unlikely that a State will
be sued for lack of authorization and supervision in and of itself. Such a
case would likely only arise in the instance that damage has occurred, and
then it will be much more important to determine whose “national activity”
caused the damage. Certainly, additional restitution may be sought for
failure to properly authorize or supervise and thus, it is in the best interest
of any State party with any spacefaring nationals to authorize and properly
supervise the entity or individual engaging in the space activity. However,
the responsibility and potential liability of a State party does not depend
solely upon whether or not it is the “appropriate” State.

14 (2011), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=
spacelaw [https://perma.cc/XE32-6FE8] (discussing Article VI and explaining the exact
scope of international responsibility in which any state carries the key clause as being a
State’s main concern in terms of implementing the authorization requirement and coverage
all situations regarding international liability).
89. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. VI.
90. 1963 Declaration, supra note 29, at ¶ 5.
91. See Cheng, supra note 45, at 26; F.G. von der Dunk, supra note 27, at 8.
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5. Liability as State of Registry
Article VIII of the OST also contributes to the uncertainty: the provision
explains that States parties retain jurisdiction and control of objects—and
personnel thereof—launched into outer space if have been entered into
their national registry.92 While “ownership” of objects launched into outer
space is not affected by their presence in outer space, “jurisdiction and
control” seems to require the existence of a registry. In addition, Article
VIII speaks in respect of personnel related to objects on their registry.93
Does this cover space tourists? If an American citizen seeks to visit a space
object registered in Japan, who has jurisdiction and control over that citizen?
What if the American citizen is placed on Japan’s space registry? Is that
person considered to be under the control of Japan, making Japan and not
the individual’s nation of citizenship responsible? Can a State avoid liability
for a space object by failing to register it?
6. Obliged to Rescue?
A final area of uncertainty directly relevant to the operation of a private
space station arises in respect of the humans in space themselves. The
“States Parties to the [OST] shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind
in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance.”94 But just
what is an astronaut? The Rescue Agreement seems to broaden the obligation
to rescue by requiring States to “render all necessary assistance” to “the
personnel of a spacecraft.”95 However, the Rescue Agreement only applies to
“personnel” who have landed on Earth, and it is silent in respect to human
actors in orbit.96 States are obligated to rescue and “safely and promptly”
return both astronauts and “personnel of spacecraft” if they are found in
their territory or in the high seas.97 But on-orbit, States are only obligated
to assist astronauts. Moreover, the OST is silent as to what such on-orbit
assistance might mean. Does it require a State to procure a launch to rescue
astronauts in space?98
92. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. VIII.
93. Id.
94. Id. art. V.
95. Rescue Agreement, supra note 21, at art. II.
96. See id.
97. Cf. id.; see also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. V.
98. Article V of the OST states that “astronauts of one State Party shall render
all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties.” Outer Space Treaty, supra
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Francis Lyall has explored the question of who qualifies as an astronaut
at some length.99 As he points out, a rule of treaty interpretation “is that
you interpret the meaning of a term as it was understood at the time the treaty
was entered into.”100 In 1967, an “astronaut was a highly trained State-employed
professional, and not simply anyone who might go into space.”101 Similarly,
“personnel” suggests that such an individual has “official duties and
responsibilities.”102
U.S. law also makes a distinction between spaceflight “crew” and spaceflight
“participant.” “The requirements for ‘tourist flight’ crew are rigorous while
those for ‘participants’ are [focused on] good health coupled with rudimentary
training [regarding] safety and escape procedures.”103 Are States parties
obliged to rescue or return to space the tourist with only rudimentary training
and a clean bill of health? It is unclear. Writing in 1972, well before the germ
of space tourism existed, Manfred Lachs asserted that tourists should be
accorded the same status as personnel and astronauts, but even then, Lachs
recognized that “greater clarification of the law on [this] subject will be
necessary.”104
E. Treaty Obligations of Private Space Actors
Having established that private space activities are within the purview
of the OST, and presuming that the State of citizenship of the traveling
entity is a signatory of the treaty, what obligations does this confer on private
space actors and on the governments, which must exercise “continuing
supervision?” The OST lists three fundamental principles. First, “freedom
[exists] in the exploration and use of outer space.”105 Second, there is no

note 20, at art. V; This implies two things: first, that rendering “all possible assistance” is
something less than “safe and prompt return; second, that such assistance is only required
of other astronauts in orbit.” This leaves a gap in respect of both artificial intelligence and
obligations of terrestrial. It is also rather telling that the Rescue Agreement itself does not
contemplate on-orbit assistance at all; Rescue Agreement, supra note 21, at arts. 1 & 2; see
Francis Lyall, Who is an astronaut? The Inadequacy of current international law, ACTA
ASTRONAUTICA 66, 1613, 1615 (2010).
99. See, e.g., id.
100. Id. at 1613.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1614.
103. Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 460.51 (2019)); see also Carla Sharpe, Legal Aspects of
Public Manned Spaceflight and Space Station Operations the Military Uses of Outer
Space, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW, supra note 5, at 648 (“any feasible definition of ‘astronaut’
would seem to require . . . an element of training and selection . . .”).
104. Lachs, supra note 12, at 67.
105. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. I(2); see also Lyall & Larsen, supra note
54, at 59.
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national sovereignty in space or over celestial bodies.106 Third, activities
in outer space must be carried out “in accordance with international law.”107
Beyond these principles, the OST prohibits a number of activities, including:
placing in orbit “any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds
of weapons of mass destruction;”108 installing nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction “on celestial bodies;”109 establishing
“military bases, installations and fortifications”110 on celestial bodies; testing
“any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial
bodies.”111 In addition, all space actors must conduct their activities “with
due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the
Treaty”112 and avoid harmful contamination of the space environment or
any adverse changes to “the environment of the Earth.”113
F. When the Little Things Go Wrong
While the OST does not provide for an enforcement or dispute resolution
mechanism, the Liability Convention requires that claims between States
be made through “diplomatic channels.”114 Should diplomatic efforts fail,
the parties “shall establish a Claims Commission”115 made up of three
members: one chosen by each party and the third, the Chairman, chosen
jointly by the parties.116 If the parties cannot agree on the Chairman within
four months, then either party may request the Secretary-General of the
United Nations to appoint one.117 Interestingly, the Liability Convention
106. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. II; see also Lyall & Larsen, supra note
54, at 59−60.
107. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. III.
108. Id. art. IV.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. art. IX.
113. Id.
114. Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. IX. To date, only one claim has been
pursued under the auspices of the Liability Convention. In 1978, the then-Soviet Union’s
Cosmos 954 satellite, which carried a nuclear reactor on board re-entered the Earth’s
atmosphere, breaking up and scattering debris over Canadian territory. For damages
“proximately caused by the intrusion of the satellite and deposit of debris,” Canada received a
payment of $C3 million. Settlement of Claim between Canada and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics for Damage Caused by “Cosmos 954” (Released on Apr. 2, 1981).
115. Liability Convention, supra note 22, art. XIV
116. Id. art. XV.
117. Id.
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allows the damaged State to pursue “local remedies”118 while simultaneously
presenting a formal diplomatic claim. The damaged State may also pursue
a claim “in the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching
State.” 119 However, if a claim is first filed in the launching State (as
opposed to seeking local remedies domestically), it cannot also be pursued
diplomatically.120
The Liability Convention also provides for joint and several liability
amongst the defending launching States.121 Thus, whenever two or more
States jointly launch a space object, they are jointly and severally liable,
allowing the damaged State to seek the entire compensation due from any
or all of the launching States.122 The Convention makes clear, that for purposes
of establishing joint and several liability, the “State from whose territory
or facility a space object is launched shall be regarded as a participant
in a joint launching.”123 Therefore, the Convention’s delineation lays a heavy
burden on the launch service provider and the State whom launch is made
a space object.
The Liability Convention also makes possible potential damages claims
against States by non-nationals.124
If the State of nationality [fails to file] a claim, another State may, in respect of
damage sustained in its territory by any natural or juridical person, present a claim
to a launching State.125 [Additionally, if] neither the State of nationality nor the
State in whose territory the damage was sustained has presented a claim or notified its
intention of presenting a claim, another State may, in respect of damage sustained
by its permanent residents, present a claim to a launching State.126

The Liability Convention is rampantly ambiguous: Among other things,
can the argument be made that non-governmental entities are agents of the
relevant State, acting in an official capacity because they are engaged in
“national activities” thus opening States up to tort liability for failure

118. Id. art. XI(1).
119. Id. art. XI(2).
120. Id.; Article XI offers an interesting construct. The first paragraph allows for a
diplomatic claim to be made while “local remedies” are pursued. However, the second
paragraph clarifies that a claim is pursued “in the courts or administrative tribunals or
agencies of a launching State,” then a claim under the Liability Convention cannot be made.
Should a “local remedy” be sought outside of a launching State and a judgement delivered,
the claiming party would still likely have to engage in diplomatic or judicial measures in
a launching State in order to enforce said judgment. Thus, the utility of permitting a local
action at the same time as a claim under the Convention appears to be lacking.
121. Id. art. V.
122. Id.
123. Id. art. V(3).
124. Id. art. VIII.
125. Id. art. VIII(2).
126. Id. art. VIII(3).

124

HANLON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 21: 105, 2019]

2/6/2020 2:42 PM

Adapting the ISS Code of Conduct
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

to supervise a negligent actor? Can criminal acts be considered “national
activities?” Does the labeling of an act as a “national activity” preclude a
lawsuit directly against the private entity? Is a vendor “procuring” a launch if
it makes an object intended for space? Are human beings “space objects?”
The illustrative scenarios set out below highlight these ambiguities and the
current space law regime’s inability to resolve the ambiguities efficiently.
III. THE PRIVATE SPACE STATION: A SPACE OF UNCERTAINTY
Accidents on-orbit happen and any manner of mishaps befalling space
station tourists or employees can be imagined. The scenarios posited will
share the same background. Assume a company formed under U.S. laws
purchases a private space station with multiple modules and components.127
Vendors in the United Kingdom (UK), South Africa, China, and Israel
supply equipment and materials. The U.S. government authorizes the U.S.
company, hereinafter referred to as Space Hotel Inc. or SHI to operate its
private space station as a space hotel.128 SHI launches the modules that
will make up the hotel at different times via different launch service providers
from the United States, the European Union (EU), and Russia. The launches
take place from locations in New Zealand, Russia, and at sea. In each case,
SHI has negotiated with the manufacturers and has registered each module
on the U.S. Registry of objects launched into outer space.129 Once SHI
assembles the space station, SHI sends three personnel, one manager and
two junior staff, to crew the space station and welcome up to seven guests
at a time. The personnel have year-long shifts on the station after they are
127. Currently, Axiom Space, Inc., and Bigelow Aerospace, LLC, are the most
vociferous about operating commercial space stations and are both registered in the United
States. See generally AXIOM SPACE, http://axiomspace.com [https://perma.cc/LU6P-PQ3J]
(last visited Nov. 21, 2019); BIGELOW AEROSPACE, http://bigelowaerospace.com [https://
perma.cc/9XNL-SUKA] (last visited Nov. 21, 2019); Lee Billings, Who Will Build the
World’s First Commercial Space Station?, SCI. AM. (May 26, 2017), https://www.scientific
american.com/article/who-will-build-the-world-rsquo-s-first-commercial-space-station/
[https://perma.cc/JK35-NQM2].
128. At this time, no U.S. law specifically deals with the operation of a commercial
space station, however, for purposes of this scenario, we will assume the United States
has established comprehensive licensing procedures.
129. The United States Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration,
gathers the registration information of each manufacturer. See 14 C.F.R. § 417.19 (2019).
The Registry is then maintained by the United States Department of State Office of Space
and Advanced Technology. See generally Space and Advanced Technology, U.S. DEP’T
ST., https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/sat/ [https://perma.cc/3FSE-65X4] (last visited Sept.
13, 2019).
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trained and housed near a spaceport in the United States. Guests, who must
undergo three days of orientation at the U.S. spaceport, may be launched
from the United States or Curaçao and stay aboard the space station hotel
for ten-day stays. Crew will also launch from either the United States or
Curaçao.
A. An Object Made in Space
1. Setting the Scene
On board Mir Space Station, on May 13, 1995, U.S. astronaut Norm
Thagard “was doing deep knee-bends, using a device with elastic straps,
when one end of a strap slipped off his foot and flew up and hit him hard
in the right eye.”130 “Even small amounts of light caused him pain, and
using the eye was ‘like looking at the world through gauze.’”131 Luckily,
an ophthalmologist at Mission Control-Moscow prescribed steroid drops—
which had been stowed as part of Mir’s medical kit.132 Thagard’s eye healed
successfully and caused no further issues during his assignment on Mir.133
Using this fact pattern, assume that rather than a government astronaut,
the injured party is an employee of SHI. Further assume that as part of his
duties, this employee was “loaned” to a UK company to carry out manufacturing
experiments on the space hotel, using UK instruments. The injury occurred
while the employee was handling an object made by the UK device. The
“object” that caused the damage, then, was made in space. A U.S. launch
service provider launched the manufacturing device from New Zealand,
the module containing the device was manufactured in Israel and launched
from French Guiana by a European Union launch service provider. The
device which caused the damage is registered on the UK register. The employee
is a citizen of Thailand who, when on Earth, resides in the United States.
Assume that the injury is more severe: the eye bleeds and swells. The
injured employee is not evacuated for eight days because SHI declined to
launch a transport earlier than scheduled though it had the ability and
window to do so. When the employee returns to Earth, it is determined that
the eye is lost. Had expert medical attention been administered within twentyfour hours, his eye could have been saved.

130. NASA-1 Norm Thagard: An Ending and a Beginning, (Mar. 14-July 7, 1995),
https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4225/nasa1/nasa1.htm [https://perma.cc/HZ4G-7XU8].
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
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2. Potential Liability
An advocate for the unfortunate Thai employee has to take into account
several factors. Considering the costs to the injured, the plaintiff’s lawyer
would seek to invoke Article VI of the Liability Convention to try to pass
the costs onto the Thai government, i.e., to reach the deeper pockets of the
defending governments. The attorney needs to first determine whether an
object made in space is in fact a “space object” for the purposes of determining
whether the Liability Convention applies. While “space object” is not
defined, liability attached to damage caused by a space object flows from
the concept of the “Launching State.”134 If an object was made in space,
it was not launched.135 Does this mean no liability attaches?
Under the Liability and Registration Conventions, the object is an extension
of the device manufactured by the UK and the Thai government may present
a claim on behalf of its “natural person” against any one or all of the following
“Launching States” based on different theories:
 Claim against the UK because the UK is (1) the registered owner
of the space object that produced the object that caused the
damages, (2) the State that “procured” the launch of the space
object responsible for the damage under the theory that by making
equipment meant for space, a company must automatically be
procuring a launch for that equipment;
 Claim against Israel, the state that procured the launch of the module
in which the object that caused the damage was produced;
 Claim against the United States, the state that launched the space
object which produced the object that caused damage;
 Claim against New Zealand, the territory from where the UK
equipment that produced the object from which damage resulted
was launched;
 Claim against the EU, the group of states that launched the module
in which the object causing the damage was made; and
 Claim against French Guiana, the territory from where the module
was launched.

134. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at arts. VI−VII; Liability Convention, supra
note 22, at art. VII.
135. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at arts. VII−VIII.
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However, as noted above, Article VII of the Liability Convention indicates
that the Convention shall not apply to damage caused by a space object of
“a launching State to: . . . foreign nationals during such time as they are
participating in the operation of that space object from the time of its
launching . . . until its descent.”136 Thus, if the object is a U.S. object, Thailand
may not be able to make a claim against the United States. But does this
preclude claims against the other launching States? Does it open the door
for the plaintiff to seek action against the private entity directly? Or is Thailand
also precluded from bringing any claims since its citizen was “participating
in the operation” of the U.S. space hotel? In this scenario, the employee
was actually “participating in the operation” of a UK object. Which “operation”
will be considered paramount?
The Liability Convention is clear that when damage occurs on-orbit, the
launching State shall be liable “only if the damage is due to . . . the fault
of persons for whom it is responsible.”137 However, launching States are
jointly and severally liable for any damage caused.138 While New Zealand
may be absolved as a matter of fault, under Article V of the Convention it
remains jointly and severally liable as the territory from where the equipment
was launched. Thus, New Zealand, French Guiana, and the United States
can be held joint and severally liable for the issues caused from the UK
equipment manufacturer and or from SHI, the company that oversaw the
installation of the equipment. Is this true even though claims cannot be
made against the United States through the Convention or the OST?
The complexities continue when considering Article VI of the OST. An
advocate for the injured Thai employee will no doubt argue that given the
provision’s negotiating history, and the Soviet Union’s stance that there
should be no private activities in space, “national activities” include
all activities of any entity in space. Then what activity caused the damage?
The manufacturing of the object? The object itself? Or the operation of a
space hotel in which the device was housed? Is conducting an experiment
in this manner a national activity? In any case, under Article VI of the
OST both the United States and the UK allegedly did not satisfy their
authorization and continuing supervision burden when they failed to ensure
that the equipment met proper safety standards. Does this open the United
States and the UK up to liability separately from the burden imposed by
its responsibility for the activities of SHI? What if it is determined that the
crew member was contributorily liable—does this negate all claims?
Both the OST and the Liability Convention are silent as to what “damages”
may be claimed. The Space Law Committee of the International Law
136.
137.
138.
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Association maintains that the definition of “damage” embodied in the
Liability Convention “is one of the widest, to date, in the field of international
law.”139 It covers “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health;
or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons[.]”140 Will the
United States and, or the UK be liable for lost wages, emotional damages,
pain and suffering? Can the UK and Thailand be liable to the United States
for loss of the services of the crew member? Article IV of the Liability
Convention States that if a third party is affected by a collision, the two
States involved in the collision “shall be jointly and severally liable to the
third State.”141 Allegedly, the space object of the UK, the exercise device,
collided with the space object of Thailand, the crew member, causing damage
to SHI. Or is Thailand absolved because its citizen was participating in
the operation of SHI?
And what about a rescue? If the “personnel of a spacecraft” is interpreted
to be the same as an “astronaut,” then Article V of the OST requires that
the astronauts of one State party, “in carrying on activities in outer space
. . . shall render all possible assistance” to astronauts of other States parties.142
This language has no qualifier. It is simply the duty of the astronauts of
States parties to render assistance to other astronauts as part of their space
activity.143 What does “all possible” mean? Did the other SHI employees,
particularly the manager, have the obligation to force SHI to launch the retrieval
spacecraft earlier than originally scheduled? Do these responsibilities carry
forward to the State that is authorizing and supervising? Do other States
with launch capabilities have an obligation to extract the employee? What
if it means they will lose a valuable seat that a space tourist had paid for?
Does the Thai individual have a claim against all spacefaring nations?
3. Where to File Suit and What Law to Apply?
The Liability Convention “grants neither rights nor responsibilities to
the private sector.”144 However, private parties may pursue local remedies
even as diplomatic steps are taken. And if a State declines to make diplomatic

139. Comm. on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, Repr. of the Legal Subcomm. on
Its Fifty-Fourth Session, at 4, A/SC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.25 (Apr. 22, 2015).
140. Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. I(a).
141. Id. art. IV(1).
142. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 20, at art. V.
143. See id.
144. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 28, at 22.

129

HANLON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/6/2020 2:42 PM

overtures, private parties may sue in the national courts145 of the launching
State. An underlying question is who to sue? If a private actor is conducting
a “national activity” can that entity be sued privately at all? Or must all
claims be made against the launching State? Can a private lawsuit be
brought against a launching State only in that launching State? Does Article
VI of the OST allow States to be sued anywhere for their failure to properly
“authorize and continually supervise?”
Here, the UK manufacturer of the device could be liable for negligence
and perhaps even strict product liability under the laws of most nations.
The SHI employee could sue in the UK. Since the space station is a registered
U.S. space object, the damage is considered to have occurred on U.S. territory;
additionally, since the crew members train and reside in the United States
while on Earth, the United States is likely the most appropriate venue—if
the Liability Convention does not preclude such a suit. Can the UK defendant
also be sued in the United States, or does the plaintiff have to file two
separate lawsuits? The UK could argue that, as a launching State, it can
only be sued in its own courts, and thus claim that the forum non conveniens
would apply if the manufacturing company has no presence in the United
States.
B. Human Error
1. Setting the Scene
On July 16, 2013, Italian astronaut Luca Parmitano’s “helmet began
filling with water just after venturing outside of the [ISS] . . . Eventually,
the water filled his eyes, ears, nose and part of his mouth, making it difficult
to breathe.”146 Parmitano is a well-trained astronaut.147 Rather than panicking,
Parmitano managed to make it safely back to the airlock “using just memory,”
even though he struggled to see or communicate and was unable to hear
anything.148 His helmet had filled with about one-and-a-half liter of water.149
The suit had leaked a week earlier, but Parmitano and his fellow spacewalker
attributed the cause to “a leaky drink bag” and did not report the issue to
NASA.150

145. Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. XI(2).
146. Miriam Kramer, Spacesuit Leak That Nearly Drowned Astronaut Could Have
Been Avoided, SPACE (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.space.com/24835-spacesuit-waterleak-nasa-investigation.html [perma.cc/YV9R-W2LU].
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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Using this fact pattern, replace Parmitano with a space tourist. The tourist,
like Parmitano, is a citizen of and resides in Italy. Assume that a prior tourist
had complained of wetness in the spacesuit, manufactured in Malaysia,
and launched by the United States at sea. However, the SHI worker, a
citizen of Iceland, dismissed the complaint and failed to adequately inspect
the suit. Untrained, the tourist panics and causes damage to the space station
hotel airlock, part of the module sourced from China and launched by Russia,
while trying to return to the station. The tourist does not suffer physical
injury, but the emotional scars are indelible. Damages would include the
actual cost to repair and the income lost for the time that the station must
be shut down to make the repair.
2. Potential Liability
Whether an individual, here the Icelandic crew member, is treated as a
“space object” for purposes of State liability needs to be determined. Relying
upon the Liability Convention, Italy may pursue a claim against:
 China, the State that procured the launch of the module which
caused the damage;
 Russia, the launch service provider of the module and territory
from where the module launched;
 the United States, the launch service provider and operator of
the space station, and the State that has control of the platform
at sea from where the spacesuit was launched.
Malaysia is not a party to the Liability Convention or the Registration
Convention and, thus, can only be required to participate in State level
negotiations pursuant to general principles of international law.151
If the Italian space tourist is a “foreign national . . . participating in the
operation of [the] space object,”152 would the United States be absolved,
leaving the other launching State liable? Or does “participating in the
operation” mean the participant has no recourse at all? Did the tourist
actually suffer damage for purposes of the Liability Convention if no physical
harm occurred?
Damage lies only if fault is proven. However, all the launching State
remain jointly and severally liable. Here, the citizen of Iceland who failed

151.
152.

See supra note 25.
Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. VII.
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to inspect the spacesuit is at fault. Is the individual’s failure a “national
activity” for which Iceland is responsible? Or is the fault with the United
States? Does the United States face liability independent of its responsibility
for SHI for failure to adequately supervise the negligent employee?
Should Italy decline to bring a claim, can the United States bring a claim
on the theory that the damage occurred on its territory? But did it? Did the
accident occur outside the airlock, or in the module when the crew member
failed to inspect the spacesuit? Can Italy, or Italy and Malaysia, be held
internationally responsible to the United States for damage to the airlock
caused by its citizen (if an individual can be considered space object) and
the “Malaysian spacesuit?” Can Curaçao, which is the territory the panicking
tourist was launched from, be held jointly and severally liable for the activities
of the tourist? Is panicking a “national activity” for which a State may be
held responsible? Could Italy, in this instance be liable for not properly
authorizing and supervising its citizen? What level of authorization and
supervision should be required of States over their human citizens, whether
they are tourists or employees? The Liability Convention allows for State
exoneration if “the damage has resulted either wholly or partially from
gross negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage
on the part of a claimant State.”153 Can panic be considered gross negligence
with intent to do damage on the part of the Italian tourist?
Furthermore, what if the Italian tourist had dislodged a piece of the space
station that later caused damage to a third-party space object? Would Italy
and the United States be jointly and severally liable for the damage that
resulted when the Italian tourist collided with the space station?
3. Where to File Suit and What Law to Apply?
Here again, claims are based on negligence. Since the space station is a
registered U.S. space object, the damage would be deemed to have occurred
on U.S. territory. Additionally, the crew members train and reside in the
United States, thus likely making the United States the most appropriate
venue, if the Liability Convention does not preclude suit. The injured
tourist could sue the United States or SHI for failure to properly supervise
the employee, the Malaysian company under product liability laws, and
perhaps China or the Chinese company for providing a faulty airlock. The
damage itself occurred outside the space station, so no territory may be
implicated, though arguably the damage occurred in the module where the
suit was stored when the employee failed to inspect, bringing the accident
into U.S. territory. Moreover, SHI and the Chinese company that provided
the module may countersue for damage to the airlock.
153.
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C. Catastrophic Collision
1. Setting the Scene
“Since its launch in 1998, [ISS] has had to maneuver out of the way of
debris 22 times.”154 “[T]he ISS crew has had to jump in Soyuz for protections
(it’s less likely that debris will hit the relatively small, hidden capsule)”
four times since 1998.155 Luckily, the ISS has been spared a catastrophic
debris collision until now. A private space station may not be so lucky,
and indeed, given the Kessler Syndrome,156 collision is likely inevitable.
To borrow from a scenario proposed by Professor Lyall, what if the South
African module of the space hotel is “punctured and loses pressure with
the result that there is enough air to sustain the life of some, but not all,
until rescue”?157 The hotel manager (from the United States) determines
that chances of survival increase dramatically if two people were to make
the ultimate sacrifice. The survivors (guests are from India, Russia, and
the United States) tell authorities that the two junior crew members (from
Iceland and Thailand) voluntarily agreed to be jettisoned into space so that
the others might survive. Back on Earth, authorities suspect that the two
crew members were forced to their death.
2. Public Liability?
Under the Liability Convention, the State responsible for the owner of
the space object which caused the damage will be liable, if ownership and
fault can be determined. While this determination may be difficult, especially
if the space object has not been properly registered with the UN or in
a national registry, “States possessing monitoring and tracking facilities shall
respond to the greatest extent feasible to a request . . . for assistance under

154. Katie M. Palmer, ISS Crew Prepares to Evacuate in Real-Life Gravity Scare,
WIRED (July 16, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/iss-crew-prepares-evacuate-reallife-gravity-scare/ [perma.cc/EF2L-C283].
155. Id.
156. Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial
Satellites: The Creation of A Debris Belt, 83 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. A6, 2637 (1978)
(“Because many of these satellites are in orbits which cross one another, there is a finite
probability of collisions between them. Satellite collisions will produce a number of
fragments, some of which may be capable of fragmenting another satellite upon collision,
creating even more fragments. The result would be an exponential increase in the number
of objects with time, creating a belt of debris around the earth.”).
157. Lyall, Who is an astronaut?, supra note 98, at 1616.
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equitable and reasonable conditions in the identification of the object.”158
Should responsibility be determined, the United States could make a claim
for damages. Should the damaging State also be liable for the deaths of
the two crew members, regardless of whether they chose or were forced to
sacrifice themselves? For the pain and suffering of those guests and crew
that survived? And should the United States, India and Russia be held
jointly and severally liable for the decision, by citizens for whom they are
responsible, to sacrifice the junior crew members? Do the crew members
have a right to life when air is scarce? Are the tourists “space objects?” If
so, Curaçao would also be jointly and severally liable as the territory from
where the tourist, or objects, were launched. Is being a tourist a “national
activity” that requires authorization and continuing supervision? Or are
all the tourists and crew members “participating in the operation” of the
space object? If so, none of them could make a claim against the United
States.
3. Where to File Suit and What Law to Apply?
There is certainly opportunity for tort liability in this scenario. The
passengers would no doubt sue the United States and, or, SHI, the South
African manufacturer of the damaged module, and the owner of the space
object which caused the damage to the space station hotel, if identifiable.
They could bring their suit in the United States, the domicile of SHI,
in India, in Russia, or in South Africa. Given that SHI maintains a training
facility in the United States, and the remaining crew member is a U.S.
citizen, there may be adequate contacts to maintain a claim in U.S. court.
There may also be the opportunity for criminal prosecution in some
jurisdictions.159 Given that the station is a US registered object, U.S. law
would likely apply.
D. Absurd?
These scenarios represent simple examples of how private individuals
may take their first steps in space. The Earth’s past spacefarers have been
“physically fit individuals . . . operating on a temporary basis in a very
hostile environment for almost solely scientific and exploratory purposes.”160
Moreover, the “credentials for being there were an extraordinarily high
level of technical training, self-discipline, and the natural ability to handle
158. Registration Convention, supra note 23, at art. VI.
159. See Lyall & Larsen, supra note 54, at 129−30 for a fascinating glimpse of this
question—whether it is a crime to murder one for the sake of the greater good.
160. Martin Menter & T. Stephen Cheston, Space Stations and Habitats, 72 PROC.
ANN. MEETING AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 270, 270 (1978).
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crises with cool logic.”161 While hotel and factory personnel may be trained,
the foundational qualification for tourists will most certainly be financial,
not physical, ability. Thus, the number and severity of accidents will likely
increase as the pool of space participants become less well-trained. As
space stations get larger and embrace manufacturing and larger work forces,
the amount and complexity of accidents is poised to grow too.
Imagine the added complexity if SHI was a joint venture with partners
from multiple nations. Space is expensive. It would not be unrealistic to
imagine space actors from several nations working together to create a
hotel or factory. Anxious to keep control of their own property, each venture
partner could plausibly want to register their own modules, meaning hotel
guests and crew would be subject to possibly two or more sovereign territories
as they enjoy their holiday or go about their workday. As the diversity of
private space actors continues to grow, these fact patterns will become
increasingly “absurd” making every on-orbit accident a potential diplomatic
disaster with resulting negotiations monopolizing civil servants and State
funds.
As our space civilization grows, intentional crimes must also be considered.
After all, it “is extremely doubtful that a major move into space will bring
about a moral regeneration of our species, so that we would live and work
with each other in Eden-like harmony.”162 What happens when a food supply
is intentionally contaminated, a physical assault or theft occurs on board,
personal items are stolen or destroyed, or valuable equipment is vandalized?163
Basically, every commercial space operator that transports or houses humans
—and the State that authorize them, the State that have citizens that contribute
to them, and the State whose citizens provide launch services and facilities—
will have to be prepared to defend themselves in any court in the world
applying local rules. Outcomes will vary and have little precedential effect.

161. Id.
162. Id. at 275.
163. Indeed, the media heralded “The World’s First Space Crime” amid claims that
an astronaut on board the ISS allegedly improperly accessed the bank account of estranged
partner. Brandon Specktor, The World’s First Space Crime May Have Occurred on the
International Space Station Last Year, LIVESCIENCE (Aug. 27, 2019) https://www.livescience.
com/anne-mcclain-space-crime.html [https://perma.cc/7F6Y-7EVY]. In this case, if
a crime is found to have occurred, the ISS Agreement makes clear that the United States
would have the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over its own personnel. And given
that all parties involved were U.S. citizens, no international jurisdiction questions would
arise. ISS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 22.

135

HANLON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/6/2020 2:42 PM

Neil Hosenball, onetime General Counsel for the U.S. National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, and head of the U.S. delegations to the Legal
Subcommittee of COPUOS, once cautioned that when it comes to space,
we must not allow “‘hyperlexus’—a pathological condition caused by an
overacting lawmaking organ . . . [to] become virulent among space lawyers.”164
Certainly this is not an unfounded concern. However, in order for space
to grow with equality, efficiency, and safety, outcomes in respect of claims
for damages that happen in space and liabilities for those damages should
not be allowed to hijack diplomacy and should not be subject to such
uncertainty or variety.
Finally, discovery costs must also be considered. In each of the scenarios,
or any situation in which fault must be alleged, costs could be exorbitant
if experts from all the companies involved want the opportunity to inspect
the on-orbit damage. Such prohibitive costs may result in quicker settlements.
They could also be a boon to manufacturers of space equipment sued
by plaintiffs who cannot afford proper investigation.
E. Space is Power
Of course, life onboard the private space station could be managed and
administered pursuant to contracts negotiated between the private parties.
However, this is hardly ideal, and could provide a poor foundation upon
which to base the laws of future on-orbit, Moon or asteroid outposts. The
dangers are threefold. First, from a litigation standpoint, the diligent plaintiff’s
lawyer will consider all avenues toward compensation for injury and will
challenge the contracts signed by space tourists and space employees as
contracts of adhesion, tying up valuable court and company time. Second,
the plaintiffs who will initially include wealthy individuals165 who may
hold great sway over government officials, will want to have claims filed
at the State level to reduce legal costs and fees. This makes it an almost
certainty that on-orbit slip-and-falls will become subject to diplomatic
negotiation, wasting taxpayer money and bureaucratic time. Third, forum
shopping, whether at the U.S. State level or at the international level will
be rampant. While such activity will assure a steady income for the motions
practitioner, it will also assure lengthy, costly court battles. This will drain
the resources of both plaintiffs who may not possess necessary funds and
companies that should be spending their money on-orbit rather than in court.

164. Id. at 276−77.
165. A trip to space currently costs $250,000, indicative of the high financial hurdle
that will determine space tourism. Matthew Smith, Commercialized Space and You, HARV.
UNIV. (June 11, 2018), sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2018/commercialized-space-and-you/
[https://perma.cc/LS3D-VXGU].
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Ultimately, the body of jurisprudence related to space law will likely end
up mired in conflict of law and choice of law rather than addressing
substantive issues.
But there is a much more important reason to be concerned. Reliance
on contract law will give tremendous power to the corporate entities and
could result in rampant despotism in these private pockets of civilization.
This phenomenon is not new. The “company town” is “a planned community
owned or controlled by a single company.”166 Company towns are especially
prevalent where corporations seek to exploit natural resources in remote
areas.167 To attract and retain a workforce, corporations “build accommodations
and provide[] basic services such as health care, education and recreational
facilities for workers and their families.”168 Company towns (some of which
still exist on Earth) run the gamut from “satanic mills” to “industrial edens.”169
The logic behind the former model is that “[b]usiness exists to make a profit,
not coddle employees [and that s]ociety as a whole benefits most when
enterprises are cost-effective, productive, and profitable.”170 The latter model,
the industrial eden, is driven by paternalism and the ideal that companies
will “share their bounty with workers and their families.”171 Both extremes
are forms of labor control, and exhibit a troubling “watchfulness toward
the citizenry on the part of company overlords.”172 Furthermore, when one
considers that “company towns” formed on private space stations are precursors
to colonies headed for the Moon and other celestial bodies, one can only
be reminded of the exploitative practices of Colonial imperialists.173

166. OLIVER J. DINIUS ET AL., COMPANY TOWNS IN THE AMERICAS 1 (Oliver J. Dinius
et al. eds., 2011).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2.
169. See HARDY GREEN, THE COMPANY TOWN (Basic Books, 2010) (analyzing of the
emergence of company towns and their role in shaping the American economy).
170. Id. at 5.
171. Id.
172. GREEN, supra note 169, at 5; DINIUS, supra note 166, at 3, 14.
173. “The legitimacy of colonialism has been a longstanding concern for political
and moral philosophers in the Western tradition. At least since the Crusades and the conquest
of the Americas, political theorists have struggled with the difficulty of reconciling ideas
about justice and natural law with the practice of European sovereignty over non-Western
peoples.” Margaret Kohn & Kavita Reddy, Colonialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(May 9, 2006, updated Aug. 29, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/colonialism/ [https://
perma.cc/Y3PE-KWNN].
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In 1966, French philosopher Michel Foucault theorized that “the anxiety
of our era has to do fundamentally with space.”174 It is not just the concern
that we are running out of space on Earth, “but also . . . knowing what relations
of propinquity, what type of storage, circulation, marking, and classification of
human elements should be adopted in a given situation in order to achieve
a given end.”175 For this reason, Foucault argues, space itself is power.176
Though Foucault warned that it would be foolish to strive for utopia,177 he
also reminds us that while communities may exist in the void of space and
within the gaps of space law, they are not in and of themselves void.178
They are, instead, bundles of relations that will benefit from explication
and illumination.179 In other words, while law may not exist, any time two
or more humans interact relationships are built. Communities develop around
those relationships. Understanding and recording the norms that govern
the relationships will help those communities thrive and expand. The private
space stations and on-orbit manufacturing facilities planned for the coming
decade are sites in which bundles of relations such as we are accustomed
to here on Earth are “simultaneously represented, contested and inverted.”180
Continuing the fiction that all acts in space are State acts distorts the
environment in which they take place. Similarly, allowing corporations to
usurp the fundamentals of space law with financially perverted paternalism
hurtles space toward freedom-stripping fiefdoms. These are conditions and
traditions that will ultimately corrupt what most philosophers would consider
inalienable rights and provide a poor foundation from which to spread
humanity to space.
IV. TERMS AND PROVISIONS GOVERNING SPACE STATION OPERATION
INCLUDING THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF
SPACEFARERS (FIRST EDITION)
Keeping Foucault’s admonitions in mind, the first step toward the governance
of human behavior in space is to describe, define and develop norms in
respect of the relationships therein. To distribute “power” evenly while
protecting basic human rights, norms must be set to guide the overlapping
174. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Des Espaces Autres [Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias]
2 ARCHITECTURE/MOUVEMENT/CONTINUITÉ 46 (1984) (Fr.), translated in Jay Miskowiec,
Of Other Spaces, DIACRITICS 22, 23 (1986).
175. Id.
176. Miskowiec, supra note 174, at 22.
177. According to Foucault, it can never be utopia, because “[u]topias are sites with
no real place . . . [t]hey present society itself in perfected form . . . [and] are fundamentally
unreal.” Id. at 24.
178. Id. at 23.
179. Id. at 23−24.
180. Id.
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interrelations between the crew, the tourists (or workers) and the operators
of the space stations. Given the scenarios181 previously discussed, the new
norms must: (1) affirm the basic rights of all spacefarers and make them equal
under the law; (2) eliminate the uncertainty for both private companies and
governments regarding responsibility and liability; (3) guide disputes into
the same or similar venues so that a uniform body of jurisprudence may
develop in respect of outer space liabilities; and (4) implement a code of
conduct which acknowledges that human behavior in space must take into
account the realities of the environment and be harmonized to assure safety
and security. The first development of what will surely be an evolving set
of rules must also account for the State monopoly of space and work
to transition slowly to an actual body of astrolaw.
A. Cruise in Space?
The concept of creating internationally accepted rules for specific and
isolated places is not exceptional. Aircraft, commercial spaces that populate
our skies, are subject to rules promulgated pursuant to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation182 ratified by 191 States. Known as the Chicago
Convention, the agreement, among many other things, established the
International Civil Aviation Organization, a specialized agency of the UN
to create rules ensuring that “international civil aviation may be developed
in a safe and orderly manner.”183 Similar regimes have been implemented
to protect the safety and security of the millions of people each year who
board cruise ships, pockets of civilization floating, hopefully with bliss,
in international waters. The International Convention on the Safety of Life
at Sea184 (SOLAS), ratified by 162 States, aims to protect individuals who
travel on such ships “by regulating vessel construction and stability, firefighting
systems, safety equipment, radio communications, safe navigation procedures,
vessel management and carriage of cargo.”185 Similarly, the International
181. See discussion, supra Section III.
182. See generally Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
183. History of the ICAO, ICAO TECH. COOPERATION, https://www.icao.int/secretariat/
TechnicalCooperation/Pages/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/W5RH-GRP6] (last visited
Nov. 9, 2019).
184. See generally International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
No. 18961, Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278.
185. Hearing on a Review of Cruise Ship Safety and Lessons Learned from the Costa
Concordia Accident Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Mar. Transp., H. Comm.
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Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, Watchkeeping for
Seafarers,186 (STCW) signed by 161 State, establishes “basic requirements
on training, competence, testing, and certification of seafarers based on
their duties aboard a vessel.”187 Each of these conventions offer good examples
of how the international community can and must work together to adopt
minimum industry standards intended to keep humans of all nationalities
safe.
However, while they guarantee the safety of the equipment, some of
these conventions fail to uniformly or adequately protect the rights of the
passengers. In aviation, State have agreed to certain rules covering everything
from what a ticket should look like to how much a passenger should be
entitled to receive in the case of an accident.188 But at sea, this is not so
clear. The legal regime governing private activities on cruise ships has been
described as an “intricate web of treaties, laws, regulations, and industrial
practices intended to protect lives, rights, and property in the maritime
realm.”189 Obtaining compensation or justice for an accident or crime at
sea “may be determined by the nationality of those involved, the ship’s
national registry, or its exact location at the time of the incident.”190 Indeed,
“even attorneys find it difficult to navigate the complex jurisdictional
boundaries, statutory definitions, treaty provisions, maritime traditions,
and fine-print liability disclaimers.”191 Even so, cruise ships, while moveable
and sometimes finding themselves in very isolated places, do dock and remain
physically bound to terrestrial law, and to the protection of individual rights
recognized by customs and laws. This cannot be said of a space in orbit.
While the commercial space industry may be too nascent for the establishment
of comprehensive safety guidelines, it is not too early to establish the
foundation upon which such regulations may be promulgated. And it can
never be too early to recognize fundamental human rights. Following is a
rudimentary proposal for the development of spacefaring terms and provisions,
on Transp. and Infrastructure, 112th Cong. 3 (2012) (Memorandum from Staff, Subcomm. on
Coast Guard and Mar. Transp.) [hereinafter Costa Concordia Hearing].
186. International Convention on Standard of Training Certification and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers No. 23001, July 17, 1978, 136 U.N.T.S. 190.
187. Costa Concordia Hearing, supra note 185, at 4.
188. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by
Air, art. 21−22, May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309, 356–57 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. Of
course, much uncertainty remains, but the effort to create uniformity is a giant step in the
right direction.
189. Hearing on Int’l Mar. Sec. II: Law Enf’t, Passenger Sec. and Incident Investigation
on Cruise Ships Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. Emerging Threats, and Int’l Relations,
119th Cong. 1 (2006) (statement of Chris Shay, Chairman of Subcomm. on Nat’l, Emerging
Threats, and Int’l Relations).
190. Id.
191. Id.
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intended not for immediate implementation, but rather to encourage debate
and discussion of this important topic. While the temptation to populate
these provisions with details exists, the overarching goal is not to micromanage
the operations of private space stations. It is to provide a base standard by
which all space stations are managed to: (1) protect human rights; (2) reduce
dispute complexities; and (3) offer a foundation from which a future human
space civilization may grow and thrive. Terms are also kept general in order
to ease international acceptance and adherence whether by international
treaty or national regulation.
B. Basic Rights of Spacefarers
In 1985, the Director of the U.S. Smithsonian Institution’s National Air
and Space Museum decided “that a project should be undertaken to determine
which of the values and principles of the Constitution could, or indeed
must, be applied to American citizens in outer space communities.”192 Over
the course of two conferences, held in December 1986 and November 1987,
the participants formulated a “Declaration of First Principles for the Governance
of Outer Space Societies” (First Principles).193 While the document has
not become “a pattern for further study and development in schools,
universities, professional associations, and citizen groups throughout the
country,”194 it does provide an example of how one might entrench the
most basic of terrestrial rights into space society.
Since the remit of the project was to determine which provisions of the
U.S. Constitution ought to be applied to outer space, the document provides
an American-centered perspective.195 The preamble soars loftily, “harkening
back to the struggle by [the US] founding fathers as they drafted their young
nation’s Constitution.”196 It is peppered with words and concepts from the
U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Declaration of Independence and U.S. jurisprudence
like “life, liberty . . . equal protection . . . fundamental freedoms [and]
192. George S. Robinson, Re-examining our Constitutional Heritage, 3 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 81, 81 (1988) [hereinafter First Principles]. The Steering Committee for the project
was made up of the following individuals: U.S. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan,
U.S. Senator John H. Glenn, U.S. Congressman Dan Fuqua, Walter Cronkite and Richard
Dreyfuss.
193. Id.; see also generally ROBINSON & WHITE, JR., ENVOYS OF MANKIND, supra
note 13.
194. First Principles, supra note 192, at 86.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 88.
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inalienable rights.”197 It is also aggressively ambitious in speaking of space
colonies that will be emancipated from Earth.
To gain wide acceptance, the conceptual frame of the author’s proposed
“Terms and Provisions Governing Space Station Operation Including the
Rights and Obligations of Spacefarers” (Space Station Terms and Provisions)198
must focus on the immediate realities, and should draw not from the U.S.
Constitution, but from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal
Declaration).199 It should also be tailored to recognize the unique environment
of a space station. Most importantly, the Space Station Terms and Provisions
must recognize that a balance will need to be struck between the safety of
the space and the rights of the humans who occupy it. Thus, the Space Station
Terms and Provisions200 preamble should:
 Recognize that “the inherent dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family [are] the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace”201 on the Earth and in outer space;
 Confirm that human beings in outer space “shall enjoy freedom
of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people;”202
 Reaffirm “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of all members
of humanity;”203
 Recognize that “the imperatives of community safety and
individual survival within the unique environment of outer space
must be guaranteed in harmony” with the inherent dignity and
the equal and inalienable rights to freedom, justice and peace
afforded to all members of the human family;204 and
 Recognize that in order to achieve these ends, there must be
established, in respect of space stations, a clear chain of command
in outer space as well as a clear relationship between ground
and on-orbit management.205

197. Id.
198. See generally Space Station Terms and Provisions, infra Appendix.
199. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
200. The proposed preliminary Space Station Terms and Provisions are set forth in
total in the Appendix hereto.
201. Id. at Preamble (quoting the Universal Declaration, supra note 199, at Preamble).
202. Id.
203. Space Station Terms and Provisions, infra Appendix.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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The Space Station Terms and Provisions must next delineate its scope
and applicability and several terms need to be defined.
First, while no agreement currently exists with respect to the definition
and delimitation of outer space,206 the scope of the Space Station Terms
and Provisions should be clear. It is proposed that “outer space” be defined,
solely for purposes of these Terms and Provisions, as the area that extends
beyond the distance of 100 kilometers above Earth’s mean sea level.207
The Space Station Terms and Provisions may borrow from the U.S. Congress
Office of Technology Assessment, which defines “space station” as “an
object or a collection of objects (attached or free-flying) which is in an
intentional, long-duration earth orbit and is, at least in part, habitable.”208
A “space station operator” may be defined as any owner of a space station
that operates the space station, i.e., who uses, causes to use, or authorizes
the use of the space station, and any representative thereof.209
In defining “spacefarer,” the Space Station Terms and Provisions must
lay to rest any debate about the definition of astronaut. As Manfred Lachs
recognized in 1972, definitions in the Rescue Convention and OST
notwithstanding, “all persons aboard a space vehicle should share a common
legal status.”210 The Space Station Terms and Provisions should make this
clear. Thus, a “spacefarer” could mean any human in outer space who shall
be accorded all the rights and responsibilities contained in the Space Station
Terms and Provisions and those afforded to “astronauts” and “personnel
of a spacecraft” pursuant to the OST and the Rescue Agreement. While this
definition goes beyond the bounds of a space station dweller or visitor, it
is important to identify the “spacefarer” as broadly as possible to set a
precedential foundation of human rights for all future space travelers and
inhabitants.
Given the primary goal of the Space Station Terms and Provisions is to
preserve human rights in space, the first article should adopt and extend
the Universal Declaration211 to all spacefaring humans as a general matter.

206. See Bhavya Lal & Emily Nightingale., Where is Space And Why Does That Matter?,
EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL U. SPACE TRAFFIC MGMT. CONF. (Nov. 5, 2014), https://
commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=stm [https://perma.cc/
S3XR-6NRE].
207. Space Station Terms and Provisions, infra Appendix. See id.
208. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 28, at 16.
209. 14 C.F.R. § 161.5 (2019).
210. Lachs, supra note 12, at 67.
211. Universal Declaration, supra note 199.
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C. Liability and the Concept of the Launching State
Having confirmed the human rights of spacefarers, the Space Station
Terms and Provisions must tackle the relationship between the spacefarer,
the space station operator and the State. An initial inclination is to
replicate the model of the International Space Station, a shining example
of a successful heterotopia where diverse individuals from multiple countries
live and work together for months at time in a small and enclosed space,
surrounded by a vacuum. If the ISS had a constitution, it would be the
Intergovernmental Agreement212 which “was the outcome of years of
negotiations.”213 Like the OST, the Liability and Registration Conventions,
and the Rescue Agreement, the ISS Agreement imposes responsibilities
and obligations at the State level.214 For this reason, the overarching
Intergovernmental Agreement itself is not an appropriate model for a
private space station. For example, the ISS Agreement provides that each
partner shall register its modules and equipment as space objects, effectively
retaining full control of them even as they are assembled into the greater
whole.215 This vivisection of the whole cannot be permitted for private space
operators. At the same time, a wholesale abandonment of the concept of
State liability for private space activity is premature.
At this early stage, the reality is that States must and will work closely
with their nationals to properly authorize (i.e., license) and supervise space
activities. The goal of the Space Station Terms and Provisions is to do what
the OST and Liability Convention do not: identify only one “appropriate
State” responsible.216 Thus, regardless of their origin, the operator of the
space station must be the registered owner of every module, component and
piece of equipment on the space station.217 Further, the State responsible
for the space station operator must agree to accept all the liability imposed
on separate launching States by the joint and several liability provisions
contained in Article V of the Liability Convention.218 While this agreement
cannot override a treaty obligation of any State, evidence of such agreement
will go far, both diplomatically and in court, to direct aggrieved parties and
prevent frivolous lawsuits. Note this would cover only the on-orbit damage,

212. ISS Agreement, supra note 6.
213. Sharpe & Tronchetti, supra note 5, at 631.
214. ISS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 7.
215. Id. arts. 6, 7, 16.
216. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Accidents & Injuries in Air Law 7 (2008), https://www.
mcgill.ca/iasl/files/iasl/Titans.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNQ8-AG84].
217. ISS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 11.
218. Id. art. 22(1).
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not damage on Earth or during launch, and it would obviate the need for
a cross-waiver of liability as set forth in the ISS Agreement.219
Agreements in which modules or component parts intended for use in a
space station are transferred pursuant to cross-border arrangements should
be acknowledged by the relevant State governments. The State should agree
up front that the operation of a space station, and all the activities related
thereto, including, without limitation, negligent and criminal actions, are
“national activities” for which the State is responsible.220 While this may
seem to place a heavy burden on the receiving State, it is simply a part of
the safety due diligence a State should owe to conduct before licensing
a space station operator or its employees.
D. Jurisprudence
The third goal of the Space Station Terms and Provisions is to limit
possible court venues for litigation. This is a tricky proposition because,
for example, there is no reason a Chinese space station operator trying to
attract Chinese spacefarers should agree to be governed by or to submit to
the exclusive jurisdiction of U.S. courts, and vice versa. However, if private
companies include identical provisions regarding their spacefaring customers
within their contracts, then courts around the world will be interpreting the
same language and will be able to borrow from, or openly criticize, court
decisions from other jurisdictions. Though the decisions may not have
precedential value over one another, it is not unusual for courts to acknowledge
and comment on other decisions, thus contributing to global discourse and
ultimately bringing global interpretation one step closer to uniformity.
A good example of this trend is the jurisprudence spawned by the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air (the Montreal Convention).221 With 126 State parties, many opportunities
exists for courts to interpret differently the definition of the word “accident.”222
Struggling to determine when to characterize an event as an accident for
purposes of the Montreal Convention, the Australian High Court took notice
of U.S. decisions (which have no authority in Australia) and “rebuked the
U.S. Supreme Court.”223 While this might seem a far cry from uniformity,
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. art. 16.
Space Station Terms and Provisions, infra Appendix, at art. II.
See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 188.
Id.
Dempsey, supra note 216.
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the fact that many jurisdictions are in the position of considering the exact
same language, and that they are willing to comment upon, if not accept
the lead from, other courts, is one step towards harmony. Therefore, State
should require all space station operators to accede to the Space Station
Terms and Provisions and include them verbatim in their contracts with
employees and passengers. Additionally, the Space Station Terms and
Provisions themselves should require that the spacefarers and the space
station operators submit to the jurisdiction of the Space Station’s State of
registry.
E. Code of Conduct
A considerable amount of thinking and negotiation has already gone
into the code of conduct that should govern the behavior of humans aboard
a space station. However, the Code of Conduct for International Space
Station Crew (ISS Code) is built on the idea that each individual is the
responsibility of his or her national or sponsoring government.224 Indeed,
Article 22 of the ISS Agreement assures that each State “may exercise
criminal jurisdiction over personnel in or on any flight element who are
their respective nationals.”225 This concept should not crossover to cover
private space stations.
Spacefarers should not be considered “space objects” for which their
citizen States are responsible.226 Instead, they should be considered private
citizens that acknowledge, accept and submit to the civil and criminal
jurisdiction of the State responsible for the space station they are joining
or visiting.227 Thus, effectively, the spacefarers, and not the private companies
that operate space objects, will truly be the first private citizens in space over
whom no government shoulders the burden of liability. Jurisdiction aside,
the spacefarers will generally be bound by any terms in their contracts
with space station operators.228 However, the Space Station Terms and
Provisions must assure that such rules have the goal of maintaining “a
harmonious and cohesive relationship among [spacefarers] and an appropriate
level of mutual confidence and respect through an interactive, participative,
and relationship-oriented approach which duly takes into account”229 the
unique circumstances of their existence in space. Again, in the interest of
creating as broad a scope as possible, the Space Station Terms and Provisions,
inasmuch as they regulate the behavior of spacefarers, should apply for
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
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ISS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 11; see also 14 C.F.R. § 1214.403(I)(B).
ISS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 22.
Space Station Terms and Provisions, infra Appendix, at art. III.
Id.
Id. arts. III, IV.
14 C.F.R. § 1214.403II(B).
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the entire duration of a space voyage including, as in the ISS Code of
Conduct, “preflight, on-orbit, and post flight activities (including launch
and return phases).”230
A most important aspect of the ISS Code of Conduct is the command
structure. Unlike in a hotel on earth, even a simple accident on a space station
can lead to destruction and death. The fact that space station visitors will
not receive the training current astronauts are required to endure emphasizes
the need for authority. Indeed, any risky activity undertaken by a tourist—
hot air ballooning, safari camping, white water rafting, and skydiving come
to mind—requires a submission by that tourist to a certain level of authority.
Thus, the provisions of the ISS Code of Conduct regarding the ISS
Commander can be adopted almost verbatim in the Space Station Terms
and Provisions, including the appointment of a flight director.231 As provided
in the ISS Code of Conduct, the commander will be the “highest authority”
on the space station.232 Her primary mission will be to ensure the safety and
security of the space station as well as harmony among the spacefarers.233
The ultimate authority and responsibility will rest with a flight director
based on the ground.234 Borrowing directly from the ISS Code of Conduct,
the commander’s main responsibilities would be to: (1) conduct operations
in or on the space station as directed by the flight director; (2) direct and
oversee the activities of the spacefarers to ensure safety and security; (3)
fully and accurately inform the flight director, in a timely manner, of the
space station configuration, status, commanding, and other operational
activities on-board (including off-nominal or emergency situations); (4)
maintain order; (5) ensure spacefarer safety, health and well-being, including
spacefarer rescue and return; and (6) take all reasonable action necessary
for the protection of the space station elements, equipment, or payloads.235
Accordingly, during all phases of on-orbit activity, the commander,
consistent with the authority of the flight director, shall have the authority
to use any reasonable and necessary means to fulfill her responsibilities.236
This authority extends to: (1) the space station elements, equipment, and
payloads; (2) the spacefarers; (3) activities of any kind occurring in or on
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

§ 1214.403I(B).
See Space Station Terms and Provisions, infra Appendix, at art. IV.
§ 1214.403I(B)(1).
Space Station Terms and Provisions, infra Appendix, at art. IV.
Id.
Id.; see also § 1214.403III(A)(2)(b).
Space Station Terms and Provisions, infra Appendix, at art. IV.
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the space station; and (4) data and personal effects in or on the space
station where necessary to protect the safety and well-being of the spacefarers
and the space station elements, equipment, and payloads.237 Any matter
outside the commander’s authority shall be within the purview of the flight
director.238 Incidentally, both the station commander and the flight director
should be duly licensed, initially by the State of registry, but ultimately,
pursuant to international standards.239
F. Implementation
Ideally, nations would come together to establish formal guidelines and
principles to responsibly incubate and nurture every aspect of our new
space economy. However, this seems unlikely, at least in the short term.
It is recommended in the meantime that nations adopt the Space Station
Terms and Provisions as part of their national regulations, require each
space station operator to abide by its provisions, and include the Space
Station Terms and Provisions as part of their private contracts. In addition,
State should require that launch service providers refuse to launch humans
to a space station unless the Space Station Terms and Provisions have been
included in contractual arrangements. Barring that, it is urged that potential
space station operators take the lead in adopting these provisions as part
of their contractual arrangements, a move that will improve certainty, as well
as safety.
G. The Space Station Terms and Provisions in Action
Applying the Space Station Terms and Provisions to the scenarios yields
far simpler results than the current regime.
1. An Object Made in Space
Recalling that Article XI of the Liability Convention permits natural or
juridical persons to pursue a claim in a launching State,240 under the Space
Station Terms and Provisions, the employee injured by the object made in
space in our first scenario would be able to bring a claim in U.S. court
against the United States. The United States would be considered both the
launching State and the “appropriate State” responsible for the national
activities of the U.S. space station as well as for damages caused by the
U.K. machinery and the object made by the U.K. machinery registered
237.
238.
239.
240.
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with the United States. Damages would be determined under American
product liability laws, thus highlighting the need for the United States to
require high levels of both accident insurance and safety measures.
Because spacefarers will be afforded the same status as astronauts, while
the question of a State’s obligations in respects to rescuing an astronaut
will not be resolved, the spacefarer’s equal status with an astronaut will be
confirmed.
2. Human Error
In the case of the leaking spacesuit, the emotionally injured tourist
would also bring a claim in U.S. court against the United States. The United
States would be considered the “launching State.” Pursuant to the Space
Station Terms and Provisions, the United States should agree that negligent
activity may be considered a “national activity,” and the negligent employee
would be considered an agent of the space station operator. Damages would
be determined pursuant to U.S. law. The space station operator would not
be able to seek damages against Italy, but it could proceed directly against
the tourist.
3. Catastrophic Collision
In the case of a collision, the damage done to the space station from the
third-party object would still be subject to the Liability Convention. The
question of wrongful death would be litigated against the United States
who would have accepted all activity as national activity, pursuant to U.S.
law.
In short, revisiting the scenarios under the proposed Space Station Terms
and Provisions does not miraculously resolve all the issues, but it removes
the civil claims from the diplomatic table and keeps the litigation in one
jurisdiction where jurisprudence and precedents may start to build. Moreover,
it keeps private entities and State fully aware of their responsibilities and
obligations, allowing them to plan accordingly with relevant and specific
insurances, inspections, background checks and licenses. And it affords real
protection for the safety, security and freedom of spacefarers.
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V. CONCLUSION: LET’S NOT THREATEN OUR ACHIEVEMENT
Today, human presence in space is aberrant. But humans are “exploratory,
migratory animal[s]”241 and outer space offers the next natural point of
our evolutionary journey. As we contemplate migration to the stars, we
have to consider the vehicles—the space—we will inhabit. We have worked
hard to adapt to the hostility of the environment and overcome the natural
sense of displacement it engenders. However, we have not yet addressed
the reality of human, as opposed to State, activity in space. We are poised
to spread humans into orbit and beyond. While the progress will be slow,
and will start with tourists, history has taught us that rules are required to
prevent exploitation and oppression. Unfortunately, our current State-centric
space law regime is not intended to serve a private space faring force. Agreeing
on a baseline of rules, such as those proposed by the Space Station Terms
and Provisions, which govern both individual behavior and the relations
between the individual, the corporate entity and the State, is a baby step
on a path toward relieving State of responsibility for private actors, recognizing
human rights in space, and developing a robust and fair body of astrolaw.
Here on Earth, we struggle to defend “the inherent dignity and . . . the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”242 We cannot
allow the vacuum of space to become an excuse for the reversal of the gains
our imperfect civilization has made as it has matured. We must work to
spread humanity with humans in all our on-orbit and off-world heterotopias
and enshrine in those spaces the power to prevent dystopia.

241.
242.

150

BEN R. FINNEY, FROM SEA TO SPACE 105 (Massey Univ. Press 1992).
Universal Declaration, supra note 199, at Preamble.
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VI. APPENDIX
TERMS AND PROVISIONS GOVERNING SPACE STATION OPERATION
INCLUDING THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF
SPACEFARERS (SECOND EDITION)
PREAMBLE:
1. Recognizing that the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family are the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace on the Earth and in outer space;
2. Confirming that human beings in outer space shall enjoy freedom
of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want, which have
been proclaimed as the high aspiration of the common people;
3. Reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of all members
of humanity;
4. Recognizing that the imperatives of community safety and individual
survival within the unique environment of outer space must be
guaranteed in harmony with the inherent dignity and the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family to freedom,
justice and peace; and
5. Further recognizing that in order to achieve these ends, there must
be established, in respect of space stations, a clear chain of command
on-orbit as well as a clear relationship between ground and onorbit management.
NOW THEREFORE, Space Station Operators and Spacefarers do hereby
agree to accept and apply the terms and provisions as hereinafter set forth.
DEFINITIONS:
For purposes of these Terms and Provisions,
“Outer Space” shall mean the area that extends beyond the distance of 100
kilometers above Earth’s mean sea level. For purposes of clarity, it is
reiterated that this definition is intended solely for the purposes of these
Terms and Provisions.
“Space Station” shall mean an object or a collection of objects (attached
or free-flying) which is in an intentional, long-duration earth orbit and is,
at least in part, habitable.
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“Space Station Operator” shall mean any owner of a space station that operates
the space station, i.e., uses, causes to use, or authorizes the use of the space
station and any representative of thereof.
“Spacefarer” shall mean any human in outer space and shall be accorded
all the rights and responsibilities contained herein and afforded to “astronauts”
and “personnel of a spacecraft” pursuant to the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and the Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (the Outer Space Treaty).
ARTICLE I:
The fundamental values embodied in the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights shall apply to all spacefarers.
ARTICLE II:
The Space Station Operator avers that the State responsible for its actions
has agreed to maintain jurisdiction and control of every space object,
including every module and component part included as part of or within
the Space Station and any object manufactured on the Space Station.
The Space Station Operator further avers that the State responsible for its
actions has agreed to accept responsibility and liability as the sole Launching
State as such term is defined in the Convention on the International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects and the Convention on Registration
of Objects Launched into Outer Space.
The Space Station Operator avers that the State responsible for its actions
has agreed that all activities related to the operation of the Space Station,
including, without limitation, negligent or criminal acts of the Space Station
Operator or any agent thereof, and that occur within and/or the vicinity of
the Space Station are deemed to be “national activities” for which the State is
responsible pursuant to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.
ARTICLE III:
This Article III sets forth the standards of conduct applicable to all Spacefarers
during preflight, on-orbit and post-flight activities (including launch and
return phases):
A. It is recognized and agreed that the Spacefarer is in space as a
private citizen and is not the responsibility of his or her citizen
government.
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B. Spacefarers conduct shall be such as to maintain a harmonious
and cohesive relationship among Spacefarers and an appropriate
level of mutual confidence and respect through an interactive,
participative, and relationship-oriented approach which duly
takes into account the unique circumstances of their shared
existence and survival in space.
C. Spacefarers shall be subject to such other rules and regulations
as may be applied by the Space Station Operator so long as the
same do not violate the spirit or letter of these Terms and
Provisions.
D. Spacefarers agree at all times to submit to the authority of the
Station Commander as set forth in Article IV below.
ARTICLE IV:
A. A duly licensed Flight Director, based on the ground, shall have
ultimate responsibility for the operation of the Space Station
and shall be in charge of the direction of real time operations
at all times.
B. A duly licensed Station Commander shall be identified for every
phase of the spacefarer’s journey. This Station Commander shall
be subject to the provisions of Article III above and report to,
and operate under the direction of, the Flight Director.
C. The Station Commander is responsible for and will seek to
maintain a harmonious and cohesive relationship among the
Spacefarers and an appropriate level of mutual confidence and
respect through an interactive, participative, and relationshiporiented approach which duly takes into account the unique
environment of the Space Station.
D. The Station Commander is the highest authority among the
Spacefarers on the Space Station responsible for the safety of the
Spacefarers and the protection of the Space Station elements
and equipment.
E. The Station Commander’s main responsibilities are to: (1) conduct
operations in or on the Space Station as directed by the Flight
Director; (2) direct and oversee the activities of the Spacefarers
to ensure safety and security; (3) fully and accurately inform
the Flight Director, in a timely manner, of the Space Station
configuration, status, commanding, and other operational activities
on-board (including off-nominal or emergency situations);
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(4) maintain order; (5) ensure Spacefarer safety, health and
well-being including Spacefarer rescue and return; and (6) take
all reasonable action necessary for the protection of the Space
Station elements, equipment, or payloads.
F. During all phases of on-orbit activity, the Station Commander,
consistent with the authority of the Flight Director, shall have
the authority to use any reasonable and necessary means to
fulfill his or her responsibilities. This authority, which shall
be exercised consistent with the provisions of Article III and
this Article IV extends to: (1) the Space Station elements,
equipment, and payloads; (2) the Spacefarers; (3) activities of
any kind occurring in or on the Space Station; and (4) data and
personal effects in or on the Space Safety where necessary to
protect the safety and well-being of the Spacefarers and the
Space Station elements, equipment, and payloads. Any matter
outside the Station Commander’s authority shall be within the
purview of the Flight Director.
ARTICLE V:
Each of the Spacefarer and the Space Station Operator avers that the
Spacefarer and the Space Station Operator has received the advice of
independent legal counsel and has read and understood all of these Terms
and Provisions.
ARTICLE VI:
Each of the Spacefarer and the Space Station Operator agree to submit to
the jurisdiction of the State in which the Space Station is registered in respect
of all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with
or incident to travel to and residence on the Space Station.
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